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Speed and scale 
If we step back and consider China's rapid international ascent within the 
confines of the world's past 300 years of history, some intriguing parallels 
emerge. China's rise appears in many ways to be propelled by the same 
historical forces associated with the climb to international prominence of 
other great powers. Although each of these industrial powers charted its 
own course, buffeted by different historical and social currents, they all 
undertook a form of capitalist development. 
China today is undoubtedly in the midst of such capitalist development. As 
noted in Chapter 2, this process is most fundamentally driven by the inherent 
human tendency to seek gain and accumulate capital. While this tendency 
exposes capitalism's less savory facets, from avarice to crass materialism, it also 
motivates diligence, thrift, and, perhaps most profoundly, human creativity. Of 
course, capitalism is in general distinguished by the rise of market institutions 
to organize the supply of our basic (and not-so-basic) livelihoods. 
Ultimately, though, a political vantage point is perhaps the least understood 
and yet the most salient for developing countries. The unique historical pro- 
cess of capitalism is characterized by the rise of capital-owning social strata 
to economic, social, and political prominence. At first these social groups 
avoid, then cooperate, engage, and compete with state elites. If a capitalist 
transition proceeds, the increasing power of capital can balance the state's 
coercive means, establishing constitutional limits that assure the security of 
property rights and the predictability of economic rules. 
While China is in the midst of a capitalist transition, the specific processes 
unfolding are often unmatched in speed and scale. In comparison to earlier 
instances of capitalist accumulation, China seems to be doing everything 
simultaneously in a much more condensed time frame. For instance, China's 
capitalism unites aspects of crude Victorian capitalism with 21st century tech- 
nology and corporate organization. When comparing changes in US history 
with China's transition, then China has combined over the past decade: 
the raw capitalism of the Robber Baron era of the late 1800s; the 
speculative financial mania of the 1920s; the rural-to-urban migration 
Capitalism in the dragon's lair 229 
of the 1930s; the emergence of the first-car, fust-home, first-fashionable 
clothes, first-college-education, first-family-vacation, middle-class 
consumer of the 1950s; and even aspects of social upheaval similar to 
the 1960s. 
(McGregor 2005: 3) 
One of the most conspicuous manifestations of Chinese development is an 
intense effort to establish a continental infrastructure. Roads, ports, railways, 
telecommunication systems, as well as power generation and transfer networks 
are being developed with breathtaking speed and scope. China has already 
built the world's second largest expressway network, with more than 4,000 
km of expressway added each year since 1998. Total length of this network 
reached 34,000 km by the end of 2004, and plans for the future are even more 
ambitious. The Chinese State Council approved in December 2004 a blueprint 
for a national expressway system of 85,000 km in length, spanning the country 
to include all cities with 200,000 or more residents (Fang 2004). 
China's establishment of a comprehensive national infrastructure parallels 
earlier instances of capitalist development, including America's westward 
expansion in the late 19th century and the building of the interstate freeway 
network in the 1950s. In similar fashion, China is experiencing a rapidly 
accelerating process of urbanization. About 220 million farmers have 
moved from the countryside to cities between 1990 and 2003 (National 
Bureau of Statistics 2004: Table 4-1) and the growth rate of urbanization is 
at nearly 2 percentage points annually (People's Daily 2005). This represents 
the biggest and fastest move from the land to the city in human history. In 
tandem with urbanization, the education system is expanding at a rapid 
pace. Between 1999 and 2004 admissions to and graduations from high 
school both more than doubled, while university enrollment grew from 
around 1.6 million to 4.5 million students, a 180 percent increase (China 
Economic Quarterly 2005: 22-23). 
On the flipside, there is a very dark quality to China's capitalist transition. 
As in all cases of initial capitalist accumulation, the processes q u r r i n g  in 
China are often cruel in nature and accompanied by social ills. China has 
seen the abus'e of the weak and the prevalence of extremely harsh working 
conditions. China's development has also been uneven with urbanization 
and greater mobility amplifying social and regional inequalities. 
One of the most fundamental contradictions facing China's capitalist 
transition is environmental destruction on a shocking scale (see Econom! 
2004). The largest industrialization witnessed in the history of civilization is 
causing rampant pollution and resource depletion. Pollution alone cost the 
Chinese economy about 3 percentage points of GDP growth in 2004. As an 
official with China's State Environmental Protection Agency put it, "China 
can't go the way of polluting first, and then treating it; the ecological system 
that shoulders economic development will be crushed" (Spencer 2006). 
Urbanization, industrialization, national integration, environmental 
degradation, and social institutionalization and stratification can be found 
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in all instances of initial capitalist development. China is no exception, 
exhibiting distinct parallels to its earlier predecessors. The first observa- 
tion is therefore that China is fundamentally tracing the path of a capitalist 
transition. However, the second observation must be that the historical, 
geographical, and external conditions facing China's emergent capitalism 
are unique. 
Up front is that China's capitalist transition is happening at breakneck 
speed on a massive scale. Phenomena unfolding are condensed in temporal 
terms and stunningly expansive in geographic terms. To one extent or 
another, all chapters in this volume engage with these two fundamental 
characteristics of China's transition. 
Chapters 3 through 5 note how China's corporate sector is developing 
rapidly and on a scale that is already having an impact on the global 
competitive landscape. These chapters trace the development of an 
information technology (IT) sector with indigenous heavyweights, the 
emergence of a sizeable venture capital industry that is transferring know- 
ledge, ideas and practices from abroad, and the advance of internationally 
competitive Chinese corporations that are in the process of mastering 
global expansion. Each in their own way thus expresses how both speed 
and scale are yielding a highly diverse political economy with considerable 
capacities at an early developmental stage. 
Chapters 6 through 8 further elucidate the deep imprints speed and scale 
are leaving on China's transformation. Chapter 6 argues that China's large 
size creates considerable divergence in regional endowments, including 
disparities in access to global markets and capital. In turn, these differences 
are shaping a variety of locally embedded political economies. It makes 
therefore more sense to speak of varieties of capitalism within China. 
Chapter 7 provides a different facet of the influence of China's huge size. 
Although the party-state attempts to exercise hermetic control over the 
generation and dissemination of information, it is just impossible to master 
the resources to undertake such an effort. China is too large with by far too 
many media outlets. Finally, Chapter 8 expresses how the speed of China's 
economic transition has far outstripped the capacity of China's political 
system to deal with mounting socio-economic imbalances. China thus 
faces an increasingly polarized populace that could undermine the Chinese 
Communist Party's (CCP) future legitimacy. 
The final three thematic chapters express the major roles that speed and 
scale play in China's enmeshment with the international system. Chapter 9 
notes how the continuation of China's export boom along the lines of earlier 
export booms in East Asia will create a formidable trading power. The 
consequence: continuous structural economic change that will task global 
society's capacity to adjust. Chapter 10 observes the major contradiction 
between the energy resources available within China and the country's 
potential future needs. Quite simply, China's energy requirements are highly 
likely to stress the globe's geopolitical balances. Finally, Chapter 11 most 
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precisely states China's dilemma of size. China is already so large at such an 
early stage in its development that continued expansion of its international 
weight is strategically "threatening" to neighbors and major world powers. 
China's geopolitical environment could thus be severely complicated by the 
very continuation of its developmental trajectory. 
The speed and scale of China's capitalist transition constitutes a 
fundamental characteristic, shaping the institutions, politics, and 
international ramifications of China's emergent political economy. Speed 
and scale also influence the three threads introduced in Chapter 1. These 
threads capture the forces of change, points of contention, and emerging 
dynamics of China's capitalist transition. Each of the three threads further 
aims to integrate the themes and arguments contained in this volume's nine 
topical chapters, thus weaving their findings into an inclusive narrative. 
The three threads 
The incomplete nature of China's capitalist transition 
The incomplete nature of China's capitalist transition represents the first 
and perhaps most influential thread. As one Chinese colleague put it, 
"China is both far away from socialism and far away from capitalism."' 
China's embryonic market economy remains highly politicized. With this, 
the institutional certainty and predictability necessary for private capital to 
expand is only partially established. 
That China is in the midst of a monumental transition is in and of itself 
not a remarkable finding. Most of the academic literature on China's 
contemporary political economy expresses this fact in one way or another. 
This volume, though, applies the capitalist lens in the hope of providing a 
comprehensive and historically accurate picture of China's transition, thus 
adding explanatory power. 
Specifically, Chapter 2 "measured" the progress of China's transition 
while employing a sufficiently general, yet precise definition of capitalism. 
In this manner, it elucidated how China continues to lack substantial 
institutional and legislative certainty. The bifurcation of secular 
authority - the rise of capital-owning social strata to political and social 
prominence - has only evolved in embryonic form. 
The capitalist lens thus draws attention to the continued Leninist constitution 
of the Chinese state and the historical legacy of China's political economy. 
As Chapter 6 laid out, China's political economy remains characterkd by 
a marked duality. Two processes - state-led development from above and 
network-based development from below - shape its distinct contours. While 
this structure has abwed local government officials and private entrepreneurs 
to cooperate and foster capitalist accumulation, state-capital relatiolls remain 
highly idiosyncratic and localized. Private entrepreneurs tend to forge clientel- 
istic ties with the local party-state, encouraging a myriad of corrupt practices. 
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1; a similar vein, Chapter 3 speaks of three tiers in China's industrial 
economy, the first of which is state-dominated, the second characterized 
by a host of hybrid firms, and the third consisting of mostly small-scale 
private firms. It is in the middle tier that both domestic and international 
forces have contributed to the rapid emergence of a vibrant IT sector. This 
sector, the authors argue, forms the vanguard of China's industrial and 
technological transformation yet remains in many ways tied to the Chinese 
state by hybrid ownership and insider dealing. 
Chapters 4 and 5 also feature the blurred borderlines between corporate 
and government sectors as a fundamental characteristic shaping China's 
venture capital industry and multinational corporations. The partial nature 
of market reforms is further highlighted in the analyses of Chapters 7 and 8. 
In particular, Chapter 7's analysis of the media sector notes how China's 
incomplete transition has created immense tensions between a capitalist 
logic predicated on maximizing commercial success and a state dominant 
logic focused on maximizing political control. 
Looking at China's role in the global capitalist system, Chapters 9 through 
11 similarly grapple with the incompleteness of China's transition. Especially 
Chapter 11 makes clear that although the "primacy of the economy" is 
influencing Chinese foreign policy, the CCP's future foreign policy orientation 
remains indeterminate. Political imperatives, such as assuring internal 
political control and regime stability, might very well limit the degree to which 
China will adopt a liberal and "internationalized" foreign policy stance. 
All the topical chapters thus reflect how China remains a political 
economy in transition. More specifically, the capitalist lens illuminates 
how this system remains shaped by two fundamental logics that clash: a 
state dominant logic emphasizing political control; and a capitalist logic 
emphasizing efficiency and commercial success. The interaction of these 
two logics shapes a host of hybrid, intermediary, and often internally 
contradictory institutions. 
State dominated capitalism in China actually fosters close ties between 
capital and the state. Rather than seeking autonomy, most capitalists seek 
to further enmesh themselves in state and party institutions, both for 
commercial and political reasons. China's emergent political economy thus 
remains dominated by the Chinese party-state, hampering the development 
of rule-based governance. This poses one fundamental question for the 
future of China's emergent political economy: will it become stuck in a form 
of "Chinese crony capitalism?" I will take this inquiry up in the last sections 
of this chapter, when I discuss the possible future scenarios facing China's 
capitalist transition. 
China's unique variety of capitalism 
The second thread infusing the narrative of China's capitalist transition 
is that China is undoubtedly generating a unique form of capitalism. 
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As noted above, standard features of capitalist development over the past 
300 years are readily apparent in China, including urbanization, industrial- 
ization, environmental degradation, and social stratification. Nonetheless, 
China's transition is unfolding under historical, geographical, and external 
conditions that differ from earlier instances of capitalist development. 
As a result, China is contributing to the generation of new capitalist 
institutions domestically and globally, something that is reflected in all 
chapters. Chapters 3 through 5 express succinctly how parts of China's 
corporate sector are melding cutting-edge features of corporate organiza- 
tion with China's unique national endowments. Chapter 3, for instance, 
argues that China is developing a multi-centric economy with considerable 
flexibility, international openness, and local diversity. Although many of 
China's IT firms continue to be characterized by close government-business 
ties and hybrid ownership, they are also showing patterns of organizational 
and strategic behavior that are likely to foster robust development. 
Coming from a similar vantage point, Chapters 4 and 5 call attention 
to how China's rapid assimilation of global capitalist norms and practices 
is generating new forms of Chinese management. In fact, Chapter 5 notes 
that China's emerging multinationals are not building traditional corporate 
hierarchies but rather international knowledge networks. A global "learning 
eff'ect" is taking place that allows Chinese companies to move into higher 
value activities while other aspects of China's domestic economy remain 
underdeveloped. 
Chapters 6 through 8, while focusing on more politically charged 
dynamics, also find that the interplay of a state dominant logic with a 
capitalist logic is creating a host of hybrid institutions. This can be seen 
in China's budding network capitalism that combines some of the benefits 
of state-led development with networks of small-scale producers. Such 
"hybridization" has facilitated the infusion of Overseas Chinese capital 
into Chinese production networks, creating institutional synergies and 
instant access to world markets. 
Chapter 7 notes another peculiar Chinese invention - the Chinese 
media conglomerate. Such conglomerates fulfill two purposes: one 
is quintessentially capitalist - to seek economies of scale; the other 
quintessentially Leninist - to simplify party oversight over media content. 
Indeed, these media conglomerates tend to use revenues from commercially 
oriented tabloids to support the promulgation of CCP propaganda in other 
less profitable news sources. Quite elegantly, this has allowed the CCP to 
combine Leninist and capitalist practices. 
Chapter 8 maps the unique political dynamics facing China's capitalism. 
Unlike many earlier capitalist developers, China's transition has been 
initiated, guided, and controlled by an ideologically anticapitalist party- 
state. So far, the Leninist constitution of this state has not allowed for any 
significant separation of political and economic powers. Rather, social 
stratification and spiraling class conflicts have driven affluent Chinese into 
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the arms of authoritarian stability. This is leading China's lower classes 
into an apparently revolutionary disposition, making a smooth transition 
toward democratic rule more remote. 
Chapters 9 through 11 further elucidate several aspects of China's unique 
capitalism. Chapter 9, for instance, compares the different dynamics and 
features of China's export boom with those preceding it in East Asia. 
Another notable aspect is how China has built a highly internationalized 
export regime while limiting the influence of foreign investors and traders 
on much of its internal trading system. Again, a dualistic picture of China's 
emergent political economy emerges. 
In sum, China has developed specific institutional features and 
organizational structures that are beginning to constitute a unique form 
of capitalism. In large part, the uniqueness of China's emergent capitalism 
stems from two sources. First, the combination of cutting-edge practices 
used under the new global capitalism with institutional arrangements 
necessitated by China's underdeveloped domestic economy. Venture 
capitalists in China, for example, need to both master the Chinese art of 
guanxi and have in-depth knowledge of new developments in global finance 
and corporate governance. 
The second source are the deep tensions and opposing forces created 
by the two dominant logics shaping China's emergent capitalism: a state 
dominant logic seeking to assure the CCP's monopoly over political organ- 
ization; and a capitalist logic creating a transformative push that expands 
capital's economic and political space. The result is a number of hybrid 
institutions, ranging from the dynamic telecommunications equipment 
manufacturer Huawei to Chinese state oil and shipping companies that 
distinctively intermingle commercial and political goals. 
The clash of these two logics also lends China's institutional 
transformation a somewhat bizarre quality. Institutions, such as media 
conglomerates, often have dual purposes that are not readily apparent. This 
is further reflected in China's international posture. Chinese diplomats 
tend to note that they do not interfere in the political affairs of other sover- 
eign nations, and that "business is business." In reality, though, economic 
and political interests are inextricably intermingled in many of China's 
institutional arrangements and commercial transactions. The international 
realm is no exception. 
Chi-% emergent capitalism and its global impact 
The third thread permeating the chapters is an intense concern with how 
China's role in the global capitalist system is likely to evolve. Many of the 
chapters reflect that China's international ascent is already a reality. Due 
to its large size, fast developmental dynamics, and unique institutional 
arrangements, China is having an impact on the globe's economics and 
geopolitics at a very early stage in its transition. And if China's evolution 
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roughly follows its present trajectory, then China's rise will reshape the 
21st century. 
On the positive, China's emergence could have a beneficial impact on 
the world economy, and especially on Asia. Already at an early stage in 
its capitalist transition China has become a force for regional economic 
integration. This is not only a result of its size but also of China's relative 
openness. At first, networks of ethnic Chinese investors built bridges linking 
China with Asia, but soon global production networks started to base 
assembly and innovation operations in the country. After WTO accession, 
these networks are upgrading and expanding. China thus figures prominently 
in the strategic decision-making of the world's largest corporations. 
The relentless opening of sector after sector to foreign trade and 
investment has also made China one of the globe's most interdependent 
economies. As a result, China has now reached a point where it has become 
quantitatively significant as a force driving world economic growth. For 
instance, China's economic boom from 2002 to 2006 has benefited its Asian 
neighbors significantly by providing considerable economic stimulus. 
In this manner, China's economic ascent could create a strong third node 
in the global capitalist system. This node is likely to integrate the economies 
of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia with China's own, 
fostering deep regional economic interdependence. Indeed, China's ascent 
might define an era in which East Asia becomes the globe's largest and most 
dynamic growth pole. 
While the potential of China in global economic terms is enormous, 
most chapters in this volume also convey some unease about the future of 
China's capitalist transition and its impact on the world. As with the rise 
of great powers before it, China's rise will be disruptive and difficult for 
the international system. First, China has already at an early stage in its 
transition produced internationally competitive corporations. Corporations 
like Pearl River Piano or Hai'er have managed to combine global best 
practices with China's unique endowments. This is also expressed in China's 
fast developing venture capital sector and the international competitiveness 
embedded in Chinese network capitalism. 
As many Chinese companies move into more advanced industries, they 
will target the more sophisticated markets that Western nations and Japan 
have so far considered their sole preserve. In the not-too-distant future, 
therefore, jobs which were thought to be immune from Chinese competition 
will start to come under pressure in developed nations. Perceptions of 
"unfair" competition will be further aggravated by the incomplete nature 
of China's capitalist transition. 
Chapter 5 situates this issue lucidly when Ming Zeng and Peter Williamson 
note that "the public in the developed world may be poorly prepared for the 
international repercussions of China's capitalist transition." Indeed, "the 
risks of protectionist or potentially retaliatory policies are aggravated by 
the fact that the key driver of overseas expansion by Chinese companies, 
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China's capitalist transition, remains far from complete." The incompleteness 
of China's transition generates opaque policy-making, an underdeveloped 
"soft" infrastructure of the economy, and significant distortions to 
market-driven resource allocation. Since the corporate practices of Chinese 
multinationals are being shaped by this incompleteness, their increasing 
weight in the global economy raises the specter of mounting frictions. China 
is already being accused by some in the West of exporting dysfunctional 
domestic practices, including corruption, bad lending, a disregard for 
labor rights, and poor environmental standards. In that sense, the present 
tensions over the exchange rate of the Chinese yuan might only be a prelude 
to even more contentious disputes. 
This issue is further elucidated by analyses in Chapters 9 through 11. 
For example, Yinhong Shi in Chapter 11 argues that the incompleteness of 
China's capitalist transition circumscribes the "primacy of the economy" 
in influencing Chinese foreign policy. This raises a two-pronged problem: 
the dilemma of China's incomplete transition combined with the dilemma 
of China's huge size. China is emerging very rapidly as a very large global 
economic power, yet its internal institutional arrangements lack legislative 
and institutional certainty. Perhaps never has the global system had to deal 
with such a large power at such an early stage in its development. 
China's continued international ascent is therefore doubly "threatening" 
to its neighbors and major world powers. First, as with the rise of any great 
power, China's ascent is fundamentally alarming because new powers tend 
to destabilize established international orders. Second, many of China's 
institutions remain underdeveloped and shaped by a one-party Leninist 
state with a historical legacy of empire. Add on Chapter 8's arguments on 
the potential for political instability if socio-economic disparities continue 
to widen, and it becomes clear why the world might be faced with a major 
capitalist power that is internally volatile. There is thus no certainty that 
China will adopt moderate foreign policies that support the international 
status quo in the future. 
In one way or another, China's unrelenting rise will reshape the globe's 
geopolitical environment. It will complicate China's international relations 
and create uncertainties over the prospects for sustaining China's own 
development. Ironically, China's continued development might constitute 
the country's biggest geopolitical liability, since China's escalating 
international impact combined with an incomplete capitalist transition will 
undoubtedly challenge established economic and geopolitical balances. 
Future scenarios 
China is irrefutably in the process of a capitalist transition. But is this 
transition sustainable? And where will it lead? Answering these questions 
necessitates some futuristic thinking, an undertaking that is generally 
discouraged in the social sciences. Despite the pitfalls associated with 
peeking into the future, I will attempt an exercise of logical analysis and 
extrapolation. The hope is that this will allow me to put forward possible 
future scenarios concerning China's capitalist transition. 
The capitalist lens adopted in this volume can shed some important light 
on the inherent tendencies in China's domestic political economy. As noted 
in Chapter 2, political imperatives could conceivably halt China's capitalist 
transition and roll back achievements to date. There are many historical 
examples of this. Clearly, there is a distinct danger that China's political 
economy could become stuck in a form of "Chinese crony capitalism," 
perpetuating the present situation in which most sizeable private firms 
must seek close clientelistic ties with government officials. In fact, to move 
beyond Chinese crony capitalism, China's political leadership will have to 
come to grips with major political trade-offs. 
One of the key distinguishing aspects of capitalist systems is their 
potential to establish rule-based governance that restrains and reshapes 
state action. The result is the gradual construction of a relatively self-directing 
and autonomous realm of the economy. Since capital moves according to 
where the greatest returns and lowest risks are, states, in order to retain and 
generate wealth, must create favorable conditions for capital accumulation. 
These conditions include establishing secure property rights, functioning 
markets, and predictable policies. At the same time, capitalist development 
expands state power enormously. States can make use of the greater 
productive capacities unleashed by economic growth, therefore marshalling 
superior organizational, financial, technological, and human resources. 
One of the most misunderstood aspects of capitalism in popular 
conceptions is that it is a purely "private" economic system. Quite to the 
contrary, the expansion of capital-owning classes serves to expand and 
reconstitute state power. In essence, capitalist development leads to a 
process of mutual empowerment whereby both the realm of the "economy" 
and that of the "state" gain in sophistication and governance capacity. 
The structural power of capital tends to keep in check the vagaries of state 
power, while the state tends to constrain the imperfections of markets and 
the avarice of humans. 
The world's history, though, shows that few state elites are willing 
to strike this "deal" with capital. Since states are inclined to acquire a 
monopoly over the concentrated means of coercion within their territory, 
they tend to squash potential competitors for power. Capital represents 
such a competitor, because its possession of wealth can rival the influence 
of the state. 
Therefore, capital remains at the mercy of state elites before capitalist 
political economies mature. Indeed, capital leads a highly precarious 
existence during the early stages of capitalist development. State elite's 
direct influence over property rights and exchange systems allows them to 
easily repress or subvert the growing power of capital-holding classes. The 
lack of widespread capitalist development in the world attests to this fact. 
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 viden nil^, one of the necessary conditions for capitalist development is a 
modicum of security provided by the state to capital. Otherwise, capitalists 
are likely to move their holdings to safe havens. 
Stated differently, for capitalist development to advance, state leaders 
must be induced to institutionalize greater political sway for capital. 
Ultimately, real or perceived threats to national and/or regime survival 
are the most common forces pushing state elites in this direction. Judging 
from how China's communist leadership views the external environment (as 
basically hostile and intent on subverting its rule) there are some grounds 
for optimism. 
Possible domestic scenarios 
China's capitalist transition has unleashed enormous increases in 
productivity, drawn large segments of Chinese society into capitalist 
relations of production, and integrated China's economy with the global 
capitalist system. Over the past years, though, the strains and contradictions 
created by China's own successes have become increasingly evident. I already 
have mentioned some of these, including environmental degradation on a 
massive scale and the accumulation of inequalities between the winners 
and losers of reform. More specifically, China suffers from many of the 
excesses typically present during initial phases of capitalist accumulation. 
These include, for example, the eviction of poor people from their land and 
homes in order to commercialize more land for construction and real estate; 
mounting instances of corruption and popular dissatisfaction with state 
governance; rapid migration of rural residents to cities and the resulting 
stresses of urbanization; and the failure to adapt China's social security 
system to the country's changed conditions. 
Faced with these challenges, what are the likely future trajectories of 
China's political economy? I will elaborate here three likely scenarios. This 
list is not exhaustive and at best tentative. The three scenarios, though, 
attempt to capture the range of possibilities without falling into extremes. 
Scenario I: in-system tinkering 
In the near future, the most likely scenario for China is that present 
arrangements stay in place. This implies that most reform efforts amount 
to in-system tinkering. One way to understand this scenario is to assume 
that the deep historical legacy of China's imperial and Leninist past would 
continue to hold sway. The state's dominance over private commercial 
and industrial capital would remain intact. The CCP party-state would 
also continue its aim of strengthening societal controls, especially over the 
generation and dissemination of information. 
Under the present leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao such moves are 
clearly evident. The idea of a "harmonious societyn reflects, on one hand, 
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an awareness of the massive stresses generated by China's capitalist tran- 
sition. On the other, it expresses that the CCP wants to take the lead in 
addressing social inequalities and environmental pressures, thus bolstering 
its domestic legitimacy. In fact, the present leadership is implicitly using 
the contradictions of China's capitalist transition to foster a new governing 
ideology. Based on Chinese people's fear of social chaos (luan), the CCP is 
tacitly encouraging a come-back of Confucian precepts, aiming perhaps to 
establish a Neo-Confucian order under CCP tutelage. 
This scenario does not preclude that certain aspects of the state's bureau- 
cracy and regulatory apparatus continue to be refined. Moreover, China's 
corporate sector would continue its development and internationalization. 
Within system tinkering might even extend to changes in the tax code and in 
the social security system to afford the weakest and most vulnerable mem- 
bers of Chinese society better economic protection. However, this scenario 
does not involve fundamental changes to China's political economy, such as 
establishing a relatively autonomous system of courts or more independent 
governmental oversight institutions, such as Hong Kong's Independent 
Commission Against Corruption. 
How long could China's political economy muddle through under 
institutional and political parameters assuring CCP dominance? In view of 
China's present social and environmental stresses the sustainability of the 
system is more likely to be measured in years than decades. For example, 
since 2003 the CCP has been tinkering with the cadre incentive system to 
press for greater social and environmental accountability on the part of 
local cadres. However, so far these efforts have not met with much success, 
reflecting the limits to in-system tinkering. 
Scenario 11: peaceful evolution 
Most Chinese quietly admit that the very best scenario for China's future 
is peaceful evolution (heping yanbian). Under this scenario, institutional 
change in state administration, law, and other spheres would be sustained, 
supporting continued progress by China's capitalism. Most importantly, 
this would entail a strengthening of the rule of law, which would have to 
include a substantial reduction in the CCP's powers to oversee and direct 
court judgments. 
Peaceful evolution would further imply that emerging political interests 
are effectively incorporated into the polity, enabling China to attain greater 
degrees of social and environmental justice. Under Jiang Zemin's "Three 
Represents," capital-owning social strata have already been given greater 
political recognition. However, as An Chen points out in Chapter 8, these 
new social interests remain under CCP tutelage. Members of China's weak 
middle classes and poor under classes also continue to feel politically 
powerless. When China's mounting social. polarization is added to this 
mix, the prospect of heightened social tensions, even if mediated by China's 
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~onf ic ian  legacy, looms large. Political developments to date, therefore, 
amount to in-system tinkering. 
Ln the end, peaceful evolution entails that China's Leninist party-state 
is gradually nudged towards becoming a "constitutional" state, something 
that will require far-reaching political reforms. For example, government 
interference in the economy would have to be diminished, ideally 
accompanied by higher standards of accountability and transparency on the 
part of local cadres. As mentioned above, structural political change would 
also need to include legal reforms, especially greater professionalism and 
independence of the courts. Lastly, reforms would have to include expanded 
channels for institutionalized policy input and feedback, such as those 
provided by effective government ombudsmen or an independent press. 
The possibility that China might gradually develop a "constitutional" 
state should not be dismissed outright. There are, however, two caveats. 
First, if China continues to evolve politically, the system that emerges 
will most likely look quite different from existing polities under advanced 
capitalism. China's political structure will undoubtedly contain distinct 
Chinese characteristics. 
Second, as Chapter 8 laid out in detail, opportunities for peaceful 
evolution might be slipping away. Such a transition could only occur 
with some degree of CCP blessing. Yet, the CCP seems far away from 
undertaking bold moves in political reform. In-system tinkering thus 
appears most likely for the foreseeable future. At some point, though, 
China's social, environmental, and political pressures might become so 
immense that social actors opt to employ more revolutionary methods to 
further their aims. 
Scenario Il l:  Chinese crony capitalism 
A final option is that by seeking to retain its monopoly on legitimate 
political organization at any cost, the CCP acts to stall China's capitalist 
transition. As with peaceful evolution, this scenario is most likely to emerge 
after several additional years of in-system tinkering, though with a contrary 
outcome. Rather than outgrowing the dominant state model, limitations 
to the security of property rights and sway of markets would ossify, 
forcing Chinese entrepreneurs to continue their subservient ties with the 
party-state. As a result, China's variety of capitalism would become stuck 
in a form of Chinese crony capitalism. 
As noted above, one of the key distinguishing aspects of capitalist 
systems is the potential for capital-owning social strata to restrain state 
action and construct a relatively autonomous realm of the economy. 
Alas, examples in world history show that the CCP might not be willing 
to yield the institutional and political space necessary for China's private 
entrepreneurs to continue their dynamism. As other state elites before it, 
the CCP seeks a monopoly over political organization and tends to suppress 
any potential competitors for power. The CCP might thus opt to continue 
its direct influence over property rights and with this private capital's 
reliance on state munificence. This, though, could start to  undermine the 
dynamic economic change experienced by China and strengthen the crony 
capitalist tendencies of China's emergent political econom~.~ 
Chinese crony capitalism would mean that private entrepreneurs, 
especially those overseeing large firms, continue to seek close personal ties 
with state and party officials. There would also be a tendency by the state 
to clamp down on independent investor interests and to strengthen control 
over foreign capital. This system would continue China's present infusion 
of corrupt practices, and strengthen the monopoly positions of many 
firms locally and nationally. Chinese crony capitalism thus implies that 
the political imperatives of the CCP "freeze" China's capitalist transition 
near its present state. Capital's state-subservient position would continue, 
engendering an alliance of weak capital with a strong Chinese party-state. 
Would such a system be sustainable? Partially this depends on whether 
China is able to retain pockets of economic dynamism (as now in coastal 
areas) while the overall political economy remains under state tutelage. 
In the long term, though, Chinese crony capitalism is quite unlikely to be 
sustained. So far, the CCP has been able to harness capital accumulation 
for the purposes of party legitimacy. This process must at some point 
exhaust itself. 
First and foremost, we do not live in a static world. Pressures emanating 
from the global capitalist system will necessitate that China's state and party 
continue to upgrade the investment climate. Moreover, Chinese leaders wn- 
tinue to perceive both internal and external threats to  national and regime 
survival. Rapid capital accumulation within China's borders could serve to 
contain and even surmount these perceived threats. Continued economic 
growth thus holds the key to the CCP's internal legitimacy and China's 
enhanced standing in the world. CCP hegemony does not stand above any 
perceived need for economic expansion. 
As a result, the CCP leadership might see itself forced to back the 
continuation of China's capitalist transition, fostering economic liberalization 
and increased political prominence for capital-owning social strata. 
Political reforms necessary to assure continued capital accumulation would 
then have to follow at some point. In a sense, the global system's capitalist 
logic would induce internal political change in China, not much unlike what 
already has taken place in a gradual manner over the past thirty years. 
This logic implies that peaceful evolution is a more likely scenario than 
Chinese crony capitalism. As noted above, however, the CCP does not seem 
to be willing to give up its ultimate authority over political organization, at 
least so far. In-system tinkering is certainly the most realistic scenario for 
the near future; while the longer term future of China's capitalist transition 
remains indeterminate. The already visible strains of China's transition 
such as widening income gaps, massive environmental degradation, and 
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plentiful instances of corruption could become too much for the system to 
bear. At a minimum, China's polity remains relatively insecure and volatile. 
The toughest challenge of a capitalist transition - the institutionalization 
of constraints on state action to construct a relatively autonomous realm of 
the economy - remains ahead. 
Znternational ramifications 
Whichever of these three scenarios shapes China's future will have 
significant implications for the world. If China continues to muddle through 
and sustains its variety of capitalism under state tutelage, greater internal 
and external frictions are likely. Similarly, if Chinese crony capitalism 
emerges as the dominant feature of China's political economy, China could 
face a prolonged period of economic stagnation and social unrest. 
Both of these scenarios imply that China continues a state-sponsored form 
of capitalism. On China's scale, this could prove to be highly destabilizing for 
the global capitalist system. Mounting financial and trade imbalances could 
trigger protectionist sentiments among both established and developing 
economies. Greater economic frictions, in turn, could alter China's inter- 
national posture. One distinct possibility is that China's leadership, when 
faced with a protectionist backlash to its exports or slowing economic 
growth, might resort to encourage a stronger and more aggressive brand of 
nationalism. Stronger emphasis on nationalism could also be triggered by 
a large shock to China's system, such as a military conflict with Taiwan, a 
major world recession, or social upheaval within China. 
A nationalist backlash, while temporarily bolstering the CCP's legitimacy, 
could easily snuff out China's forces of change, especially those fostering 
greater international openness. The limited advances made by China's 
private entrepreneurs and business leaders might then dissipate, making 
China's already somewhat insecure polity even more volatile. Political 
change in this direction also raises the specter of a form of Chinese fascism 
emerging. Although this must be regarded as a distant possibility, a move 
in this direction would express the CCP leadership's inability to progress 
politically. 
The consequences of such developments would be dire for the world. 
China is already a giant trading and manufacturing power. It possesses 
rapidly advancing military capabilities and an expanding diplomatic and 
cultural reach. An upsurge of Chinese nationalism would create immense 
dangers for the Asia Pacific region and the world, ushering in a period of 
international conflict and economic instability. East Asia's economic boom 
of the early 21st century might then seem like a distant mirage. 
Even without a nationalist backlash, the internal political situation in 
China could destabilize the country. The strains of China's capitalist transi- 
tion are already palpable, such as widening income gaps and environmental 
degradation. Most importantly, though, China's leadership might just 
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simply lack the political will to advance the country's transition. Reforms 
could stall, pushing China into an equilibrium characterized by increased 
corruption and continuing lapses in governance. Again, the world would 
be faced with a major economic power encompassing volatile internal 
conditions. 
A more optimistic outlook would see China making continued advances 
in economic and political governance. This would involve the process of 
peaceful evolution by which China gradually develops a "constitutional" 
state, though most likely with distinct Chinese characteristics. China's 
budding capitalists could then emerge as a truly competitive force, 
fundamentally altering the nature and logic of global capitalism. 
Under this scenario, China is likely to surface as a much more open pol- 
itical economy than those of Asia's earlier developers, especially Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan. Indeed, China's network capitalism facilitates 
economic integration among economies containing large segments of 
Overseas Chinese. In addition, China's political efforts to engage with the 
region, especially the establishment of a free trade area in East Asia, could 
further support China's emergence as a major trading power. China could 
then arise as a new center for global economic activity by the next decade, 
bolstering its position as the economic hub of East Asia. 
Put differently, if China roughly follows the path of peaceful evolution, 
the prospects for the smooth integration of China into the global political 
economy improve. Some of the effects, however, might still be difficult to 
deal with. China's rapidly developing corporate sector would most likely 
emerge as a competitive threat to many established corporations and 
endanger jobs in the developing and developed world. Moreover, as China's 
power expands the potential for both China's leadership and other world 
powers to mismanage China's international ascent increases. As I noted 
above, both external and internal factors could derail China's capitalist 
transition, with reverberations ranging from virulent nationalism in 
China to greater political instability in East Asia. If events unfold rapidly, 
problems in China could even generate a global economic shock. 
In the end, China is already a colossus at a very early stage in its 
capitalist transition. Since China's authoritarian political constitution is 
unlikely to change in the near future, the world will be faced with a large 
economic power that nonetheless contains substantial institutional and 
legislative instability. China's size and transitory nature could therefore 
have destabilizing influences, even if China continues to make political 
advances. 
Undoubtedly, the emergence of China as a major capitalist political 
economy is starting to alter global institutional arrangements. And if 
China's economic trajectory does not change, the country will become 
a formidable economic player, heating up economic and geopolitical 
competition. Clear signs of this are visible. As China's international 
influence grows, regional powers will have to realign their foreign policies. 
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~ l r e a d ~  this is causing increased tensions between China and Japan, and 
will most likely create greater tensions between China and the United 
States in the near future. 
As with the rise of other great powers before it, China's rise will be dis- 
ruptive and difficult for the international system to absorb. Can the world 
accept and live with capitalism in the dragon's lair? This will be the major 
question for the geopolitics and economics of the early 21st century. 
Notes 
1 Informant 66, Beijing, 2005. 
2 See Chapter 6 for a definition of crony capitalism. 
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